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R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a
Coherent Approach to Mandatory
Minimum Sentences under Section 12
Lisa Dufraimont*

I. INTRODUCTION
Among the difficult problems facing Canadian courts under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is the challenge of dealing
with legislation that can be constitutionally applied in the great majority
of cases but infringes Charter rights in a few cases. One potential
solution to this problem, which has frequently been raised since the early
days of the Charter, is a constitutional exemption.2 Using this remedy, a
court could uphold the legislation but exempt an individual from an
application of the law that would violate his or her Charter rights.3 The
possibility of a constitutional exemption has most often been raised in
the context of the section 12 guarantee against “cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment”. It is argued that mandatory sentencing
provisions that apply validly in the general run of cases result in cruel
and unusual punishment in the unique circumstances of certain
offenders.4
For many years the status of such constitutional exemptions was
uncertain. The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a “narrow” version of
the remedy exempting an individual Charter applicant from the
*

Queen’s University, Faculty of Law.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
For a detailed history of the idea of constitutional exemptions under the Charter, see
Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: Myth or Reality?” (1999-2000) 11 N.C.J.L. 411, at 41629.
3
See, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, ON:
Canada Law Book, 2006), at para. 14.560 [hereinafter “Roach”].
4
For example, this argument for a constitutional exemption was raised unsuccessfully in
R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”], where the
defence contended that the mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in the circumstances.
1
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application of a law that had been struck down during the period that the
declaration of invalidity was suspended.5 Some argue that the Supreme
Court occasionally, albeit implicitly, accepted constitutional exemptions
in a broader form by upholding the validity of statutory provisions while
declining to apply them or limiting their application in particular
circumstances.6 Clearly, though, the Supreme Court never explicitly
acknowledged that constitutional exemptions exist as a Charter remedy
outside the discrete context of suspended declarations of invalidity. As
controversy raged around this important remedial question,7 Canada’s
highest Court repeatedly declined to decide the issue.8 Thus, the idea that
a statutory provision could be upheld under the Charter but that
exemptions could be granted to individuals whose rights were
unconstitutionally affected found explicit approval only in the judgments
of lower courts9 and in the minority positions of individual Supreme
5
See Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Corbiere”]; Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional
Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift Resolution” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231, at
233 [hereinafter “Sankoff, ‘Swift Resolution’”] (contrasting the “narrow” form of constitutional
exemption, which applies only during a suspended declaration of invalidity, with the “broad” form
of exemption that allows a statutory provision to be upheld but permits rare individuals to be
exempted from its application).
6
In Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.),
the Court held that the indefinite incarceration of a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual
punishment on the facts of the case, even though the dangerous offender provisions permitting
indefinite incarceration were constitutionally valid. It has been argued that the remedy in Steele
amounted to a constitutional exemption. See Allan Manson, “Motivation, the Supreme Court and
Mandatory Sentencing for Murder” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 65, at 69; R. v. Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No.
2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 37 (B.C.C.A.). The case of R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81,
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rose”] has also been cited as an instance where the Court
implicitly recognized a constitutional exemption. See Allan Manson, “The Claim of the Rose Case:
Jury Addresses and Humble Echoes of Reply” (1999) 20 C.R. (5th) 300, at 301; Peter Sankoff &
Ursula Hendel, “Creating a Right of Reply: Rose is Not Without a Few Thorns” (1999) 20 C.R.
(5th) 305, at 312; Roach, supra, note 3, at para. 14.667.
7
Among commentators favouring the use of constitutional exemptions, especially under
s. 12, were Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
2007), vol. 2, at 53-11 and Roach, supra, note 3, at paras. 14.600, 14.630, 14.660. Critics of
constitutional exemptions included Morris Rosenberg & Stéphane Perrault, “Ifs and Buts in Charter
Adjudication: The Unruly Emergence of Constitutional Exemptions in Canada” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 375.
8
See, e.g., Latimer, supra, note 4 (finding that a constitutional exemption was unavailable
to the accused, but leaving undecided whether such a remedy could be available in another case);
Corbiere, supra, note 5, at para. 22; R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C.
(3d) 321, at 404 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”].
9
The leading case imposing a constitutional exemption was R. v. Chief, [1989] Y.J. No.
131, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265, at 278-79 (Y.T.C.A.). For a full review of lower court decisions both
endorsing and rejecting the use of constitutional exemptions, see Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”,
supra, note 5, at 253-58.
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Court judges.10 The Supreme Court’s long-standing reticence on this
issue introduced an undesirable level of uncertainty into Charter
adjudication.11
Recently in R. v. Ferguson,12 a unanimous Supreme Court held that
“a constitutional exemption is not an appropriate remedy for a s. 12
violation.”13 Ferguson has provided some long-awaited answers about
the availability of constitutional exemptions. At the same time, one
should not overestimate the extent to which Ferguson has resolved the
deeper controversies animating the constitutional exemptions debate.
The case concerned constitutional exemptions from mandatory minimum
sentences. It is unclear to what extent it can be taken as authority that
constitutional exemptions are unavailable as a remedy outside of section
12.14
Even within the section 12 context, Ferguson has raised as many
questions as it has answered. The judgment addressed the issue of
constitutional exemptions in isolation from the larger section 12
analysis, when what is needed is an integrated and coherent approach to
this Charter guarantee.15 By sidestepping the larger issues about the
application of section 12 to mandatory minimum sentences, the Court
left unresolved the basic problem presented in the case: how are courts
to deal with sentencing provisions that operate constitutionally in most
cases but have unconstitutional effects in rare cases? Ferguson has
established that constitutional exemptions are not the answer, but what
the answer might be is far from clear. I will argue that Ferguson raises
the unsettling possibility that section 12 provides little protection to

10

See R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 94 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Morrisey”], per Arbour J., concurring (“In cases of manslaughter involving the use of
a firearm and arising from criminal negligence causing death, I believe that the better approach is to
read the mandatory minimum as applicable in all cases save those in which it would be
unconstitutional to do so.”); Rose, supra, note 6, at para. 66, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring
(“Section 24(1) of the Charter, however, enables a Court to grant a constitutional exemption from
legislation that is constitutional in its general application if in the circumstances of a particular case
an unconstitutional result would otherwise occur.”).
11
See especially Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, supra, note 5.
12
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”].
13
Id., at para. 2.
14
See Stephen Coughlan, “The End of Constitutional Exemptions” 54 C.R. (6th) 220
(acknowledging that Ferguson is unclear on this point and arguing that the Supreme Court should
decide that its rejection of constitutional exemptions applies outside of s. 12).
15
On the need to address s. 12 in an integrated way, see Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”,
supra, note 5, at 242-44; Allan Manson, “Morrisey: Observations on Criminal Negligence and s. 12
Methodology” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 121.
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individuals whose exceptional circumstances render the application of a
mandatory minimum sentence cruel and unusual.

II. OVERVIEW OF R. V. FERGUSON
Ferguson16 involved the shooting death of a detainee by an Alberta
RCMP officer. Moments after escorting him into a cell, the officer shot
the victim twice, once in the abdomen and a second time, fatally, in the
head. The victim was intoxicated and there was a scuffle between the
two men before the two shots were fired at an interval of up to three
seconds. The officer was charged with second degree murder but a jury
convicted him of manslaughter. Though manslaughter with a firearm
carries a mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment,17
the sentencing judge found that that sentence would be cruel and unusual
in the circumstances and granted a constitutional exemption, imposing a
conditional sentence of two years less a day. The Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal and imposed the mandatory four-year sentence.
Before the Supreme Court, the defence did not argue that the
mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter with a firearm should be
struck down,18 but only that the accused should be exempted from its
application. The defence contended that the four-year minimum was
constitutional in most applications, but that courts should decline to
apply it in those rare cases where it would lead to an unconstitutional
punishment.19 Writing for the unanimous court, McLachlin C.J.C.
rejected this argument and dismissed the appeal. She found that the
mandatory minimum sentence was not cruel and unusual in the
circumstances. The trial judge’s finding that the sentence was grossly
disproportionate was based on errors underlying his view of the facts,20
16

Supra, note 12.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 236(a) [hereinafter “Criminal Code”].
18
Such an argument would have encountered the difficulty that the Supreme Court upheld
the same minimum sentence for the closely related offence of criminal negligence causing death
with a firearm in Morrisey, supra, note 10. See Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 11.
19
In making this claim, the defence adopted reasoning from the concurring judgment of
Arbour J. in Morrisey, supra, note 10, at paras. 66, 94.
20
Because the jury convicted the accused of manslaughter, the trial judge properly
concluded the jury must have rejected both the defence claim that the officer shot the victim in selfdefence and the Crown’s contention that the officer acted with the requisite intent for murder.
However, according to McLachlin C.J.C., the trial judge erred when he tried to reconstruct the
jury’s reasoning process and when he found facts inconsistent with the jury’s verdict and contrary to
the evidence. According to the trial judge, the jury must have concluded that the accused officer
fired the first shot in self-defence and that the second shot was an instantaneous and instinctive
17
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and once these errors were set aside there was no basis for such a
finding.
Although it was not necessary to resolve the issue, McLachlin C.J.C.
went on to hold that constitutional exemptions are not available to
remedy violations of section 12. The Chief Justice presented four
reasons. First, after reviewing the conflicting case law on constitutional
exemptions, she concluded that the weight of authority lies against them.
Second, she reasoned that to grant a constitutional exemption from a
mandatory minimum sentence would intrude into the legislative sphere
by effectively giving sentencing judges discretion in the face of
mandatory legislation aimed specifically at supplanting judicial discretion.
Third, she argued that constitutional exemptions are inconsistent with
the remedial scheme laid out in sections 24(1) and 52(1) of the Charter,21
under which unconstitutional laws must be struck down pursuant to
section 52(1) and not “left on the books subject to discretionary case-bycase remedies”.22 Finally, McLachlin C.J.C. reasoned that to grant
constitutional exemptions from mandatory sentencing provisions would
undermine the rule of law by introducing uncertainty about whether
statutory law applies in a given case. Having rejected the option of
constitutional exemptions, the Court concluded that any mandatory
minimum sentence that creates an unconstitutional result under section
12 should be struck down.

III. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE CHARTER
The constitutional exemptions question resolved in Ferguson
engages some larger questions about section 12. Since Ferguson leaves
striking down as the only remedy for mandatory sentences that violate
section 12, one can hardly grasp the implications of the decision without
some appreciation of the phenomenon of mandatory minimum sentences
and their relationship to the Charter guarantee against cruel and unusual
response to his police training. In the view of McLachlin C.J.C., the trial judge’s view of the second
shot was inconsistent with the jury’s rejection of self-defence and contrary to the evidence that there
was an interval between the two shots.
21
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides: “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed
by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Section 52(1)
provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or effect.”
22
Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 65.
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punishment. To provide the necessary context, I will review, first, the
status of minimum sentences in Canada and, second, the broader
contours of the section 12 analysis.
1. Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Canada
By imposing a mandatory minimum sentence, the legislator reduces
or eliminates the role of judicial discretion in sentencing for a particular
offence. A mandatory minimum sentence establishes a floor that limits
the options of the sentencing judge, who may be entitled to impose a
harsher penalty than that stipulated in the statute, but is precluded from
imposing a lighter one.23 Minimum sentences are the exception to the
rule in Canada, where the vast majority of offences carry no minimum
penalty and sentencing is typically individualized. Still, there are dozens
of minimum sentences in the Criminal Code and their numbers have
been increasing rapidly in recent years.24 As of 2006, about 40 Criminal
Code offences carried minimum terms of imprisonment, including first
and second degree murder, numerous firearms and weapons offences,
various sexual offences involving children and a few impaired driving
offences.25 Most of the minimum sentences attached to firearms offences
and sexual offences involving children were introduced in 1995 and
2005, respectively.26 The federal Tackling Violent Crime Act, which
passed into law in February 2008, increases existing minimum sentences
for firearms and impaired driving offences and introduces escalating
minimum penalties for repeat firearms offences.27
Politicians appear to support mandatory minimum sentences because
they send a tough crime control message that appeals to voters.28 More
principled arguments have also been advanced in favour of mandatory
23

Elizabeth Sheehy, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy” (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall L.J. 261, at 261 [hereinafter “Sheehy”].
24
See Nicole Crutcher, “The Legislative History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of
Imprisonment in Canada” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 273 (reviewing the minimum sentences of
imprisonment introduced in Canada until 2001, and noting that such sentences have progressively
become more common).
25
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Mandatory Minimum Sentences by
Wade Riordan Raaflaub, PRB 05-53E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2006), online at:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0553-e.pdf>.
26
Id.
27
Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6.
28
Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287 [hereinafter “Doob & Cesaroni”].

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

465

minimum sentences: they are said to contribute to crime control by
deterring or incapacitating offenders, and to reduce disparities in
sentencing.29 But the available evidence indicates that mandatory
minimum sentences are generally ineffective in controlling crime.30
Moreover, mandatory minimum sentences that involve substantial terms
of imprisonment are known to invite evasion by justice system officials,
to shift sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors, to increase
incarceration rates and result in the unnecessary incarceration of
offenders who pose no threat to society, to exacerbate systemic
discrimination when they are imposed disproportionately on racialized
accused, and to cause a host of other ill effects in the criminal justice
system.31 Consequently, mandatory minimum sentences have been widely
condemned by academic commentators and policy commissions.32
There are a number of reasons to conclude that mandatory minimum
sentences represent an unwise policy choice, but it is their potential to
result in grossly disproportionate sentences that raises Charter concerns.
The Criminal Code identifies proportionality as the fundamental
principle of sentencing: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity
of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”33
Because they preclude individualized consideration of these matters,
mandatory sentences strain against this overarching principle.34 An
overview of the leading Supreme Court judgments on section 12 will

29
Department of Justice Canada, Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime,
Sentencing Disparities, and Justice System Expenditures by Thomas Gabor & Nicole Crutcher
(Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division, 2002) at 1, online at: <http://justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/reprap/2002/rr02_1/rr02_1.pdf> [hereinafter “Department of Justice Canada”].
30
See Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 28, at 291 (“[M]andatory minimum sentences do not
deter more than less harsh, proportionate, sentences.”); Department of Justice Canada, id., at 29-32
(reviewing research on mandatory minimum sentences in various offence categories and finding
little evidence that any of them were effective in controlling crime). But see Thomas Gabor,
“Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Utilitarian Perspective” (2001) Can. J. Crim. 384, at 389
[hereinafter “Gabor”] (cautioning against generalizing about the effects of mandatory minimum
sentences, which apply to various types of offences and range in severity from temporary licence
suspensions to life imprisonment).
31
See Department of Justice Canada, supra, note 29; Athar K. Malik, “Mandatory
Minimum Sentences: Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or Political Expediency?” (2007) 53
Crim. L.Q. 236, at 241-54; Gabor, id., at 392-400; Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 28, at 293-97.
32
Sheehy, supra, note 23, at 262-64 (noting the dearth of academic literature supporting
mandatory minimum sentences and the strong critiques of such sentences from the Canadian
Sentencing Commission, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, and other policymaking bodies).
33
Criminal Code, s. 718.1.
34
For example, Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of
Punishment” (2008) 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57, at 69.
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reveal the constitutional implications of this potential for disproportionality
in sentencing.35
2. Section 12 Jurisprudence
The foundational case on section 12 is R. v. Smith,36 which struck
down a minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for importing
any amount of narcotics as a violation of section 12 that could not be
saved under section 1. Significantly, it was not argued that the minimum
sentence would be cruel and unusual in the circumstances of the accused,
a repeat offender who had imported a large amount of cocaine. Instead,
the section 12 argument was based on the notion that the minimum
sentence was overly broad and would capture a sympathetic hypothetical
offender for whom the punishment would be cruel and unusual: a
youthful first-time offender caught importing a single marijuana joint.
Writing for a plurality of judges, Lamer J. held that section 12 prohibits
“grossly disproportionate” punishments that are “so excessive as to
outrage the standards of decency”.37 Since Smith, gross disproportionality
has been the hallmark of the section 12 analysis.
In R. v. Goltz,38 the Supreme Court elaborated on how hypothetical
circumstances could be considered in the section 12 analysis. Goltz
concerned a constitutional challenge to a provision in a provincial statute
that imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’
imprisonment for knowingly driving while prohibited. Writing for a
majority of the Court, Gonthier J. divided the section 12 analysis into
two steps. First, a court should consider whether the challenged penalty
would be grossly disproportionate for the offender before it, given the
circumstances of the offence and the offender. Second, if the punishment
would not be grossly disproportionate on the facts of the case, the court
should consider whether the challenged penalty would be grossly
disproportionate in “reasonable hypothetical circumstances, as opposed
to far-fetched or marginally imaginable cases”.39 Applying this two-step
analysis to the penalty and the offence before it, the majority found that
mandatory minimum sentence did not infringe section 12.
35
For a more detailed review of the cases, see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The
Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367, at 372-81.
36
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
37
Id., at 139.
38
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
39
Id., at 497.
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A final case that sheds light on the method of analyzing mandatory
minimum sentences under section 12 is R. v. Morrisey.40 The accused, a
remorseful first-time offender, was convicted of criminal negligence
causing death after he jumped onto a bunk bed while intoxicated and
holding a loaded rifle, fell, and accidentally discharged the rifle at a
friend who was lying on the top bunk. Because the offence was
committed with a firearm, a mandatory minimum sentence of four years’
imprisonment applied.41 Despite sympathetic facts, the defence conceded
that the minimum sentence would not be grossly disproportionate as
applied to the particular offender, so the section 12 challenge turned on
the hypothetical analysis laid out in Goltz.42 Once again, Gonthier J.
wrote for a majority of the Supreme Court, upholding the mandatory
minimum sentence under section 12. Gonthier J. emphasized that “courts
are to consider only those hypotheticals that could reasonably arise”,43
explained that the hypotheticals considered should be “common”44 and
dismissed various reported cases as “marginal” situations that should be
excluded from the analysis.45 Despite having conceded that criminal
negligence causing death “can be committed in an almost infinite variety
of ways”,46 Gonthier J. considered that there were only two types of
common situations meriting consideration as reasonable hypotheticals:
individuals playing with firearms and hunting accidents. In neither case,
the majority held, would the four-year minimum sentence be grossly
disproportionate.
Justice Arbour delivered a concurring judgment in Morrisey
disagreeing with the majority’s analysis of hypothetical cases. In the
view of Arbour J., to limit the analysis to “two generic situations”
conflicted with the nature of the offence of criminal negligence causing
death, which could be committed in a wide variety of ways.47 Moreover,
she argued that real past cases should not be excluded from the
reasonable hypotheticals analysis, even if their facts seemed unusual. In
light of the range of circumstances in which the offence had arisen in the
past, Arbour J. considered it inevitable that cases would arise in which
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.).
Criminal Code, s. 220(a).
Supra, note 38.
Morrisey, supra, note 40, at para. 33 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at paras. 32 and 50.
Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 64.
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the four-year minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate.
However, instead of striking down the mandatory minimum, Arbour J.
would have upheld the sentencing provision “generally, while declining
to apply it in a future case” where the sentence would be grossly
disproportionate.48 In essence, Arbour J. endorsed the use of a constitutional
exemption in an exceptional future case. Of course, Ferguson49 has now
ruled out this proposed solution to the problem of the exceptional case.

IV. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE
What, then, is to be done about exceptional cases? The problem
requires resolution if we accept, as did Arbour J. in Morrisey,50 that
unusual cases will occasionally arise where mandatory minimum
sentences that generally apply in a constitutional manner produce cruel
and unusual punishments for particular individuals. This potential to
create grossly disproportionate sentences inheres in mandatory minimums,
which by their nature efface distinctions between cases,51 and increases
with the range of conduct covered by the offence and the harshness of
the minimum penalty. It is, of course, impossible to predict the future
circumstances of offenders and offences within which mandatory
minimum sentences will give rise to instances of gross disproportionality.52
Yet one can easily imagine cases in which some of Canada’s mandatory
minimum sentencing laws would impose cruel and unusual punishments.
Compassionate homicides provide an obvious example. A loving
spouse or adult child who kills a terminally ill and suffering family
member could, if the killing was planned and deliberate, be guilty of first
degree murder and be subjected to a mandatory sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years.53 The consent of the
48

Id., at para. 66.
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).
50
Supra, note 40, at para. 82.
51
See Allan Manson, “Motivation, the Supreme Court and Mandatory Sentencing for
Murder” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 65, at 71 (“By submerging individual characteristics and the infinite
circumstances in which offences can be committed into a uniform mould, the mandated sentence
will inevitably produce at least some unfair and inordinately harsh responses.”).
52
See Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 53 (B.C.C.A.).
53
The mandatory sentencing provisions appear in ss. 235(1) and 745 of the Criminal Code.
Several real Canadian cases of compassionate killings, some with the victim’s consent, are
discussed in the dissenting reasons of Bayda C.J.S. in R. v. Latimer, [1995] S.J. No. 402, 99 C.C.C.
(3d) 481, at 531-39 (Sask. C.A.). In all these cases the accused pleaded guilty to lesser offences and
non-custodial sentences were imposed.
49
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victim, which seems important to the killer’s moral culpability,54 would
provide no legal excuse.55 The mandatory punishment appears grossly
disproportionate in these foreseeable circumstances, but the Supreme
Court has held that these sentencing provisions are consistent with
section 12.56
Existing mandatory sentences for offences involving firearms and
other weapons also seem apt to create occasional injustices. For
example, a youthful and naïve martial arts enthusiast who returned from
vacation with a souvenir set of nunchucks could be subjected to the oneyear mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for knowingly
importing a prohibited weapon.57 And as the discussion of Morrisey58
revealed, the offence of criminal negligence causing death can be
committed in circumstances approximating a tragic accident, but when it
is committed with a firearm it attracts a mandatory minimum sentence of
four years’ imprisonment.59 In sum, mandatory minimum sentences raise
a possibility of grossly disproportionate sentences in a variety of factual
circumstances.60
Accepting, then, that exceptional cases present a problem in the
context of mandatory minimum sentences, I will now consider whether
and how Ferguson61 contributes to a solution. First, it is argued that the
Court lost an opportunity in Ferguson to craft a sensible solution by
recognizing constitutional exemptions. Second, the problem of the
exceptional case is identified as a matter of overbreadth, and the
competing approaches to remedying overbreadth are discussed. Finally, I

54

Coupled with the fact that the victim was the accused’s vulnerable disabled child, the
absence of the victim’s consent weighed in favour of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder was not grossly disproportionate in the
difficult circumstances of R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). For
commentary, see H. Archibald Kaiser, “Latimer: The End of Judicial Involvement and an
Unsatisfactory De Facto Beginning of the Clemency Process” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 42 (arguing that
the sentence was appropriate); Don Stuart, “A Hard Case Makes for Too Harsh Law” (2001) 39
C.R. (5th) 58, at 63-64 (arguing that the sentence was grossly disproportionate).
55
Criminal Code, s. 14.
56
R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
57
See Criminal Code, s. 103. Of course, the accused would have had to know that this
importation was unauthorized.
58
Supra, note 40.
59
See Criminal Code, s. 220(a). See also Roach, supra, note 35, at 411 (suggesting that this
mandatory minimum sentence should have been struck down in Morrisey, supra, note 40).
60
For further examples, see Paul Calarco, “R. v. Ferguson: An Opportunity for the
Defence” 54 C.R. (6th) 223.
61
Ferguson, supra, note 49.
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will argue that, in the context of the section 12 jurisprudence, Ferguson
creates a gap in the protection offered by this Charter guarantee.
1. The Lost Opportunity of Constitutional Exemptions
By rejecting constitutional exemptions in Ferguson, the Supreme
Court of Canada has foreclosed a workable solution to the problem of
the exceptional case. As McLachlin C.J.C. pointed out, the primary
benefits of a constitutional exemption remedy are that exemptions
introduce some desirable flexibility into the constitutional analysis and
offer courts a way to preserve legislation that is constitutional in its
general application.62 On examination, these benefits undercut some of
the criticisms levelled at constitutional exemptions in Ferguson.
The Chief Justice reasoned that recognizing constitutional
exemptions within the context of mandatory minimum sentences would
undermine the legislative intent underlying such provisions, which is to
exclude judicial discretion.63 This argument suffers from two
weaknesses. First, it relies on the dubious assumption that blind rigidity
in sentencing constitutes a constitutionally valid legislative objective to
which courts must defer. Second, this legislative deference argument
reflects an implausible and uncharitable reading of Parliament’s intent.
The Court’s reasons suggest that Parliament’s primary objective in
enacting mandatory minimum sentences is to exclude judicial discretion
in every case without exception: to ensure that, for sentencing purposes,
exceptional cases receive the same treatment as ordinary cases. On this
view, catching cases with unusual facts becomes a central feature of the
legislative intent.
Would it not be more reasonable to conclude that Parliament’s main
objective in passing a mandatory minimum sentence is to set a new,
tougher standard of punishment for the offence as a whole?64 This
understanding of the legislative purpose finds support in the public
discourse surrounding mandatory sentences, in which legislators and
others emphasize the potential for mandatory sentences to enhance

62

Id., at paras. 38-39. See also Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing
Problem Requiring a Swift Resolution” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231, at 232.
63
Ferguson, id., at paras. 52-56. See also Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. (3d)
321, at 404 (S.C.C.), relying on a similar argument in declining to apply a constitutional exemption.
64
Related aims that can reasonably be attributed to Parliament include creating a new level
of certainty about that punishment and reducing disparities in sentencing.
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public safety by “getting tough” on crime.65 Understood thus, the
legislative intent driving mandatory minimums seems congruent with the
possibility of constitutional exemptions, which could vindicate the aims
of the legislation by ensuring that tough minimum sentences would be
applied in the great majority of cases. Arguably, then, the course of
legislative deference lies not in rejecting constitutional exemptions but in
embracing them as a mechanism for preserving legislation.66
Chief Justice McLachlin’s claim that constitutional exemptions are
inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the Charter67 is also questionable.
Admittedly there has been some confusion about whether constitutional
exemptions (if they existed) should be grounded in section 52(1) or
section 24(1) of the Charter.68 Laying aside that complex and technical
issue, however, constitutional exemptions appear consistent with the
flexible approach to remedies that has developed under the Charter. In
Schachter v. Canada,69 the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional
remedies of severance and reading in, explaining that their purpose “is to
be as faithful as possible within the requirements of the Constitution to
the scheme enacted by the legislature.”70 The same argument applies to
constitutional exemptions, which as explained above can be used to
preserve legislation. The mere fact that constitutional exemptions change
or mitigate the effects of the legislation is no reason to rule out the
remedy. Any change goes only so far as to ensure compliance with
Charter standards.71
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For example, in announcing the passage of the recent Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C.
2008, c. 6, Justice Minister Rob Nicholson declared that “today, we can say goodbye to the days of
soft, lenient penalties for violent criminals”. Department of Justice Canada, News Release,
“Canadian Communities Now Safer as Tackling Violent Crime Act Receives Royal Assent”
(February 28, 2008) online at: <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2008/doc_32226.html>.
As noted above, it is doubtful that such “tough on crime” policies are effective in enhancing public
safety. Nevertheless, that is the stated goal with which they are generally pursued.
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See Allan Manson, “The Charter and Declarations of Invalidity” (1990) 74 C.R. (3d) 95,
at 99; Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2006), at
paras. 14.630, 14.660.
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Ferguson, supra, note 49, at paras. 58-66.
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Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: Myth or Reality?” (1999-2000) 11 N.C.J.L.
411, at 434-41; Kent Roach, supra, note 66, at para. 14.570.
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at 700.
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Roach, supra, note 66, at para. 14.890.
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2. Approaches to Overbreadth
The implications of Ferguson72 must be considered in the context of
the evolving section 12 jurisprudence. Since the early days of the
Charter, the Supreme Court has consistently held that mandatory
minimum sentences are not inherently cruel and unusual,73 but its
approach to the problem has shifted over time. As Kent Roach has
observed, the Supreme Court has become progressively more deferential
to legislative choices imposing mandatory minimum sentences.74 The
Court’s willingness to find violations of section 12 in hypothetical cases
— once robust in Smith75 — has been winnowed down in Goltz76 and
Morrisey77 to the extent that it now provides little scope to challenge the
constitutionality of these punishments.78 And like the narrowing of the
reasonable hypotheticals analysis, the rejection of constitutional
exemptions in Ferguson forms a part of this larger deferential trend.
Thus, these two movements in the section 12 jurisprudence — the
narrowing of the reasonable hypotheticals analysis and the elimination of
constitutional exemptions — appear broadly consistent.
Unfortunately, taken together, these two movements create a problem
in the section 12 analysis. Properly understood, constitutional exemptions
and the reasonable hypotheticals analysis represent competing approaches
to controlling legislative overbreadth.79 Commentators have frequently
observed that the availability of constitutional exemptions makes it seem
unnecessary to strike down laws under the reasonable hypotheticals
72

Supra, note 49.
Latimer, supra, note 54, at para. 88; Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at
495 (S.C.C.); Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 143 (S.C.C.).
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Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences”
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367, at 369, 372, 383 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”].
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Supra, note 73.
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Supra, note 73.
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[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.).
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See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2005), at 454 [hereinafter “Stuart”]; Allan Manson, “Morrisey: Observations on Criminal
Negligence and s. 12 Methodology” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 121, at 124.
79
See Robert Frater, “The Sharpe Edge of the Corbiere Wedge: Are ‘Reasonable
Hypotheticals’ Still Reasonable?” (1999) 25 C.R. (5th) 307, at 308. Mandatory minimum sentences
can be overly broad in the sense that, even when they generally produce proportionate results, they
can operate in exceptional cases to produce grossly disproportionate sentences. This notion of
overbreadth under s. 12 is distinct from the issue of overly broad offence provisions, which can give
rise to violations of s. 7 of the Charter (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”); R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (striking
down an overly broad offence provision under s. 7).
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analysis, while a robust approach to reasonable hypotheticals reduces the
attraction of constitutional exemptions.80 This complementarity arises
because reasonable hypotheticals analysis and constitutional exemptions
have the same function: to provide a remedy for the exceptional case.
After Ferguson,81 the pressing question is what to do with exceptional
cases when neither remedy is available.
Commentators have pointed out that constitutional exemptions seem
consistent with an American approach to constitutional review that holds
laws to be invalid “as applied” to individual claimants; reasonable
hypotheticals analysis, by contrast, conforms to the Canadian approach
under which the normal remedy is to strike down unconstitutional laws.82
Thus, some have argued that constitutional exemptions are both inconsistent
with the approach to judicial review under the Charter and, in light of the
availability hypothetical analysis, unnecessary:
In Canada, … extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals, unfettered by
issues of standing, allows for a fulsome scrutiny of a provision’s
validity in light of a myriad possible applications. 83

The logic of the argument is undeniable, but there is an obvious
problem: under section 12, “extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals”
is no longer permitted. After Goltz84 and Morrisey,85 reasonable
hypotheticals must be common, which seems to rule out any consideration
of exceptional circumstances.86
An example from the case law might prove instructive. In R. v.
Kumar,87 the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a section 12
challenge to the 14-day mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that
attaches to a second drinking and driving offence.88 For a majority of the
court, Taylor J.A. held that the provision could not be struck down using
the reasonable hypotheticals analysis because the situations in which the
80
See, e.g., Stuart, supra, note 78, at 455; Rosenberg & Perrault, “Ifs and Buts in Charter
Adjudication: The Unruly Emergence of Constitutional Exemptions in Canada” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 375, at 382; Sankoff, supra, note 62, at 243.
81
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).
82
Rosenberg & Perrault, supra, note 80, at 377-89.
83
Id., at 382.
84
Supra, note 73.
85
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.).
86
See Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 74, at 386 (“Exceptional circumstances
relating to particular offenders are, unfortunately, not caught by the generic notion of commonly
occurring examples”).
87
[1993] B.C.J. No. 2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (B.C.C.A.).
88
Criminal Code, s. 255(1)(a)(ii).
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punishment would be grossly disproportionate, though they existed,
would be “rare”.89 However, Taylor J.A. found comfort in the fact that a
constitutional exemption would be available if and when such a rare case
arose.90 However, that source of comfort is no longer available. Now that
the Supreme Court has ruled out the constitutional exemptions under
section 12, the problem of the exceptional case is more perplexing than
ever.
3. The Gap in Section 12 Protection
Peter Sankoff has explained that, if constitutional exemptions are not
available, courts have three options when confronted with a law that is
constitutional in most applications but infringes section 12 in rare
instances: first, to offer no remedy to those rare individuals whose
Charter rights are infringed; second, to broaden the reasonable
hypotheticals analysis to encompass exceptional cases; or third, to
permit reconsideration of precedents upholding the constitutionality of
the law and thereby allow the law to be struck down when an
exceptional case emerges.91 The first option — providing no remedy —
seems unacceptable because it would leave individuals without any way
of enforcing their Charter rights. For this reason, Sankoff considered it
“virtually inconceivable that this approach would be adopted”.92
Certainly no court in Canada would ever explicitly endorse this option,
but one cannot ignore the possibility that, in practice, Charter claimants
may be left without a remedy when their section 12 rights are violated in
exceptional cases. When the obstacles facing the other options are
considered, the disturbing possibility emerges that offering no remedy to
the exceptional section 12 claimant represents the path of least resistance.
The second option — broadening the reasonable hypotheticals
analysis to encompass exceptional cases — appears unavailable until
such time as the Supreme Court opts to reconsider its analysis in Goltz93
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Kumar, supra, note 87, at para. 56.
Id., at para. 59: “… I am persuaded that there is ample justification for the application of
a ‘constitutional exemption’ in those particular, perhaps very unusual, cases in which a breach of
Section 12 could be shown …”.
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Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift
Resolution” (2003) U.B.C. L. Rev. 231, at 244.
92
Id., at 244.
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and Morrisey.94 Such reconsideration seems unlikely in light of the fact
that the unanimous Court relies extensively on these cases in Ferguson.95
Since there is clear authority from the Supreme Court of Canada that
hypotheticals must be common, it is not open to a lower court to broaden
the analysis.
The third option — permitting courts to reconsider prior cases
upholding the constitutionality of the law in light of new facts — seems
to be the only real choice.96 This option would require a judge to strike
down a mandatory minimum sentence, even one that has previously
survived a section 12 challenge, when the accused before the court
would otherwise be subjected to a grossly disproportionate sentence.
There is language in Ferguson97 to support this result. The Chief Justice
rejected the suggestion that
no remedy is available in the case of a mandatory minimum sentence
that brings about an unconstitutional result — for instance, in
circumstances not previously considered as part of a reasonable
hypotheticals analysis. If a mandatory minimum sentence would create
an unconstitutional result in a particular case, the minimum sentence
must be struck down.98

At first blush, this simple statement seems to answer all possible
objections, but serious problems emerge on closer examination.
On the basis of this brief passage, can we really expect lower court
judges faced with exceptional cases to disregard prior decisions on the
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences? The Supreme Court
of Canada has upheld the mandatory minimum sentences for murder99
and criminal negligence causing death with a firearm,100 even though
there are imaginable circumstances where these penalties would be cruel
and unusual. In the face of these apparently binding precedents, is it
realistic to think a judge will strike down those mandatory minimum
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Supra, note 85.
Supra, note 81.
96
Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, supra, note 91, at 244 (suggesting that this option
represents the most likely course).
97
Supra, note 81.
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Id., at para. 13 (emphasis added).
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Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
100
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punishments when a uniquely sympathetic case comes to court?101
Ultimately, the suggestion that the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences can be reconsidered in light of new facts represents
a more radical challenge to the principle of stare decisis than the
Supreme Court appears to have appreciated. More than a passing
reference from the Court is needed to ensure that claimants in
exceptional cases have a remedy when a mandatory minimum sentence
imposes cruel and unusual punishment.
To complicate matters further, certain parts of the judgment in
Ferguson contradict the idea that decisions on section 12 issues are open
to re-examination in novel circumstances. One reason the Chief Justice
offered for rejecting constitutional exemptions is that “[t]he matter of
constitutionality would not be resolved once and for all as under
s. 52(1)”.102 This passage implies that rulings on the constitutionality of
mandatory minimum sentences under section 12 are final and binding.
But if we accept that a minimum sentence can be struck down if it would
be cruel and unusual punishment on the facts, then section 12 rulings are
only final in the rare cases when they strike the law down. Decisions
upholding mandatory minimums, on the other hand, should always be
open to reconsideration in light of novel circumstances. The Chief
Justice’s reference to resolving section 12 issues “once and for all”
draws no apparent distinction between successful and unsuccessful
Charter challenges, and arguably undermines the notion that decisions
upholding mandatory sentences can be reconsidered. Moreover, the
Court referred elsewhere in Ferguson to the precedential value of
Morrisey on the constitutionality of the minimum sentence for
manslaughter with a firearm;103 Morrisey upheld the constitutionality of a
mandatory minimum sentence, yet the Court in Ferguson treated it as a
binding precedent. Thus, Ferguson sends mixed messages about whether
section 12 rulings can be reconsidered and how judges should respond to
exceptional cases.
Quite apart from the question of finality, there are problems with
leaving section 12 cases perpetually open for reconsideration. If courts
must wait for the exceptional case before striking down a mandatory
minimum that has unconstitutional effects, then overly broad mandatory
101
See Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, supra, note 91, at 243 (considering the possibility that a
real person whose circumstances were not considered under the reasonable hypotheticals analysis
might be “trapped by a binding precedent”).
102
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103
Id., at para. 11.
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sentences may stay on the books indefinitely. And leaving overly broad
laws on the books has important costs. Of course, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion may mean that the most sympathetic offenders
are likely never to be charged. But unfettered prosecutorial discretion
hardly constitutes an adequate guarantee of constitutional rights.
Moreover, if courts must wait until the exceptional claimant appears
before them to strike down overly broad mandatory minimum sentences,
then prosecutors have the power to insulate laws from constitutional
scrutiny by declining to press exceptional cases.
The fundamental problem is that the persistence of an invalid
mandatory minimum sentence has distorting effects.104 Accused persons
may feel pressure to plead guilty to lesser offences to avoid the possible
application of an overly broad mandatory minimum. 105 In embracing a
robust approach to the analysis of hypotheticals in Smith,106 the Supreme
Court suggested that an accused is entitled to have the sentencing issue
decided without regard to a mandatory minimum sentence that is
constitutionally infirm.107 This objection merits consideration before
Sankoff’s third option (permitting courts to reconsider the
constitutionality of sentencing laws in light of new fact situations) is
clearly and finally adopted.
Taken together, the Supreme Court’s section 12 judgments leave a
potential gap in the protection offered by this Charter guarantee. Given
the strict limits on the reasonable hypotheticals analysis and the
unavailability of constitutional exemptions, a possibility exists that a
Charter applicant will be left without a remedy when a mandatory
minimum sentence that is generally constitutional has unconstitutional
effects. Recognizing this possibility as unacceptable does not make it
any less real.108
104
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V. CONCLUSION
Ferguson109 creates problems by hiving off the constitutional
exemption question from the broader section 12 analysis. Once the case
is considered in its jurisprudential context, it becomes clear that the
problem of the exceptional case demands further guidance from the
Supreme Court. If the Court envisions lower courts striking down
mandatory minimum sentences despite higher court decisions upholding
them, then that expectation should be made explicit. If, on the other
hand, the Court considers that exceptional cases are best incorporated
into the reasonable hypotheticals analysis, then the narrow approach laid
out in Goltz110 and Morrisey111 must be discarded and a more generous
section 12 methodology adopted. My own view is that the latter course is
preferable, but clear guidance in either direction would be preferable to
the current state of uncertainty. As the law stands, section 12 may fail to
protect individuals in exceptional circumstances.
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